Abstract-In existing model-based timing channels, the requirement for the target model to be shared between the sender and the receiver limits the sender's ability to adapt to changes in the inter-packet delay (IPD) distribution of the application traffic. In this paper, using analog fountain codes (AFCs) with a general model-fitting coding framework, we design timing channel schemes that allow the sender to change the target model without synchronizing with the receiver. We first propose analog fountain timing channels based on symbol transition when the application packet streams have IPD distribution that is shape similar to the distribution of AFC code symbol values. For more general packet streams, we then propose analog fountain timing channels based on symbol split in which the linearly mapped symbols are split using a symbol probability split matrix to mimic the IPD distribution of the application traffic. We use real VoIP and SSH traffic to compare the proposed schemes with modelbased timing channels using LT codes and AFC. Experimental results show that both the proposed schemes are model-secure. The robustness of the two schemes is higher than the model-based timing channels using LT codes whereas not as good as those using AFC when the sender and receiver sides are synchronized with respect to the target model. Moreover, when the sender and the receiver are not synchronized with respect to the model, the robustness of the proposed schemes is significantly higher than model-based timing channels.
by hiding them in open overt communication channels [1] , [2] . Compared to information hiding in digital media files [3] , [4] , covert channels that use network traffic have no limit on the amount of cover information and allow for secret information to be transmitted over long periods of time. This makes finding the starting and ending times of the covert traffic and further detection challenging. Network timing channel is an important class of covert channels in which secret message is modulated into the timing information of overt traffic, predominantly into the inter-packet delays (IPDs) [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] .
Undetectability and robustness are the two main goals in the design of covert timing channels. Here, undetectability means that the adversary cannot detect the existence of the timing channel by distinguishing between covert and legitimate traffic [6] , [7] , using statistical techniques such as Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) test [10] , [11] , Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test [5] and entropy test [12] among others. On the other hand, robustness pertains to the ability of the covert channel to operate despite the jitter inherent in communication networks, especially in wireless links where signals suffer from several channel disruptions including channel noise, fading, pathloss and interference. Additionally, an adversary may also disrupt the covert channel by maliciously adding noise. Consequently, high degree of robustness is the foundation for guaranteeing the success of timing channels.
In some of the earlier implementation of timing channels [5] , [13] , covert message bits were modulated by sending (or not sending) a packet during a time interval or by modulating the timing between keystrokes. Later, the characteristic of cover traffic was considered in the design of timing channels [14] , [15] . In a model-based timing channel, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of IPDs of the cover traffic is used to generate the resulting covert traffic [14] . The CDF can be derived from samples of the legitimate traffic or it can be the CDF of a distribution that is known to approximately characterize the application traffic (e.g., the Pareto distribution for SSH traffic [16] ). In model-based modulation, the goal of undetectability can be approximately achieved when there is no obvious statistical difference between the IPD distribution of the covert traffic and that of the legitimate traffic.
The robustness of model-based timing channels can be enhanced using forward error correcting codes [6] [7] [8] , [17] [18] [19] [20] . Besides consideration of some implementation details (e.g., the efficient guard band strategy to minimize error due to network jitter [19] ), the common design process of most robust and undetectable timing channel schemes can be divided into two relatively independent parts: 1) encoding and modulation at the sender and 2) demodulation and decoding at the receiver. At the sender, the secret message bits are first encoded into codewords of a finite or infinite error correcting code (e.g., spreading codes [6] , [7] , convolutional codes [20] and fountain codes [19] ). The generated codewords are then modulated into IPDs with model-based modulation. At the receiver, the inverse process is employed. The received IPDs are demodulated into estimated codewords which are then decoded to extract the secret message bits.
As most network traffic is non-stationary, a key challenge in model-based timing channels is that the sender needs to frequently update the model to adapt to the changes in the distribution of the legitimate traffic. This is necessary to avoid detection. However, this also requires that the sender transmits the adjusted model to the receiver. However, frequent transmissions of the adjusted model is not always possible and use up limited channel capacity. To the best of our knowledge, existing model-based timing channels always assume that the empirical model is fixed. With the difficulty of updating the model, the model shared between the sender and receiver must be strictly consistent, even if the secret message is precoded with an error correcting code. Any change in model at the sender may compromise the integrity of the timing channel.
In this paper, beyond the traditional requirements of undetectability and robustness, model-adaptation is also taken into consideration. Model-adaptation measures the adaptability of the timing channel to mismatches between the model at the sender to that at the receiver. Specifically, high degree of model-adaptation means that the timing channel permits the sender to adjust the model without loss of undetectability or robustness. In this paper, we adopt a general model-fitting coding framework based on analog fountain codes (AFC) [21] [22] [23] to design and implement the timing channels. The proposed framework allows the sender to change the model without synchronizing with the receiver.
At the sender, the secret message bits are first encoded into real-valued code symbols using AFC. The code symbols are then linearly mapped into the value range of the target model with two linear mapping parameters. Based on the difference in the shape between the distribution of linearly mapped code symbol values and that of the target model, each linearly mapped symbol is redistributed with a symbol probability transition matrix or symbol probability split matrix to generate IPDs with a distribution that is highly consistent with that of the target model. At the receiver, the observed IPDs is a superposed signal of the linearly mapped symbols, the model-fitting noise and the channel noise. The secret message is decoded by a modified belief propagation (BP) algorithm without knowledge of the distribution of the target model and the channel noise. The model-adaptation of the model-fitting coding framework is achieved in that the sender can modify the symbol probability transition matrix or symbol probability split matrix to approximatively minimize the power of the model-fitting noise over time.
The following are the key contributions of this paper: 1) We propose a new framework to design timing channels that are not only undetectable and robust but also model-adaptive. The latter enables the sender to adjust the model to the dynamic changes in the traffic generated by the application without synchronizing with the receiver. 2) The proposed timing channels inherit the rateless characteristic of AFC. This ensures that the throughput of the timing channels is adaptive to the channel characteristics. Furthermore, the proposed timing channel schemes can be easily extended to multicast covert timing channels. 3) We present detailed comparative analysis of the proposed timing channel schemes with other timing channel design based on rateless codes. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the preliminaries including modelbased timing channels, performance metrics, adversary model and analog fountain codes. In Section III, we summarize related work on existing robust and undetectable timing channels. Then, in Section IV, we give an overview of the analog fountain timing channels based on symbol transition. We describe the design of the symbol probability transition matrix, model-fitting encoding and decoding methods. In Section V, we introduce the design of analog fountain timing channels based on symbol split which can be viewed as the extension of that based on symbol transition. Experimental results and analyses are presented in Section VI. Finally, in Section VII, we give a conclusion for this paper and discuss the future work. Fig. 1 shows a generic model-based timing channel system. The source and the destination are two end-points of some overt application. The source is the overt sender which generates a packet stream (referred to as legitimate traffic) which is transmitted to the destination (overt receiver) over a multihop network. The covert sender and the covert receiver are the end-points of the timing channel. They can be implemented in network elements in the path between the source and the destination or they can be integrated with the source and the destination. Hereinafter, the covert sender and the covert receiver will be referred to as the sender and the receiver, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Review of Model-Based Timing Channels and Notation
In model-based timing channels, the sender can manipulate the IPDs at different layers of the protocol stack but predominantly the modifications are done to the IPDs of the network layer packets. Before the timing channel is established, a codebook and a model of the IPDs are shared between the sender and the receiver [14] . The latter can either be derived from filtered legitimate traffic or some well-known model of the application traffic. The secret message is first encoded with the shared codebook and then modulated into IPDs following the model. The resulting traffic is referred to as the covert traffic. The covert traffic is monitored by the warden who is able to access all the flows between the source and the destination and can apply various statistical tests to determine the presence of timing channels. The receiver can extract the secret message by first demodulating the observed IPDs and then decoding the message bits. The IPDs observed at the receiver are different from those transmitted by the sender both due to network jitter and any noise injected by the warden.
In the rest of the paper, we use lower case letters (e.g., a) to represent a particular value of the corresponding variable denoted in upper case letters (e.g., A). Calligraphic fonts (e.g., χ) represent a finite set and P (χ) denotes the probability distributions on the elements of the set χ. A vector with length N defined on the alphabet χ is represented as a bold lower case letter (e.g., v ∈ χ N , v (i ) or v i denote the i -th element). Similarly, a matrix with dimensions M and N is represented as bold upper case letters (e.g., X ∈ χ M×N , X (i, j) or x i, j denote the j -th element in the i -th row). Pr (·|·) denotes conditional probability. The index set of a certain element a in a vector v is represented by v (a) = {i : v (i ) = a}. x denotes the largest integer that is not larger than x, x denotes the smallest integer that is not smaller than x, and round (x) denotes the integer nearest to x. For a finite set
A Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CSPRNG) can generate a set of numbers according to a true random distribution. Specifically, a pseudo-random sequence of arbitrary length v ∈ χ n can be uniquely generated with a seed κ and will be denoted
The variables used in our proposed schemes are defined as follows.
• m = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k ) is the binary sequence of the secret message, m i ∈ {0, 1}.
. .) are the IPDs of the legitimate traffic.
. . are the IPDs generated after modulation by the sender.
• • M ST is the symbol probability transition matrix.
• M S S is the symbol probability split matrix.
B. Performance Metrics 1) Undetectability:
A timing channel is Polynomial Undetectable with respect to a security parameter δ if there exists a negligible function υ (δ) such that
, where d and d s are arbitrary N samples of IPDs of the legitimate traffic and covert traffic, respectively. We assume that N is a positive integer. In this paper, KLD test [10] , [11] , K-S test [5] are employed to evaluate the undetectability of the proposed timing channels.
2) Robustness: The robustness is measured in terms of the bit error rate (BER) p e for a given covert transmission rate R under channel noise including real channel noise and the common additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The covert transmission rate is defined as the average number of message bits transmitted per packet.
3) Model-Adaptation: For model-secure timing channels [17] , the model is shared between the sender and the receiver before the covert channel is established. However, the IPD distribution of legitimate traffic varies over time due to the non-stationary nature of network flows generated by real applications. In order to guarantee undetectability, the sender needs to adjust the model in real-time. Since it may not be always possible for the sender to transmit the adjusted model to the receiver, it will result in a mismatch between the sender and the receiver. This will result in demodulation and decoding error and hence higher BER. The model adaptation θ R is measured by the degradation in robustness for a given covert transmission rate R when the model is modified. This is given by
where p e and p * e denote the BER of the decoded message for the conditions that the models between both sides are consistent and inconsistent, respectively, K L (Model, Model * ) denotes the KLD between the original model and the adjusted model. A larger value of θ R corresponds to higher degree of model-adaptation.
C. Adversary Model
We assume that the adversary (warden) has full administrative authority over the legitimate and covert traffic. This implies that the model of the traffic established from captured legitimate traffic samples is known to the adversary. For a passive adversary, the goal is to detect the existence of timing channels or extract the ciphertext of the secret data while ensuring that the normal communication is not affected. On the other hand, an active adversary has higher privileges than the passive one. In order to disrupt the timing channel, random timing channel jammer may be maliciously added into the channel and even worse, the legitimate transmission may also be interrupted temporarily when the adversary suspects the existence of a timing channel. However, these actions may affect the overt communication.
In this paper, we assume that the adversary has access to both legitimate and covert traffic, and has the knowledge of the proposed timing channel schemes. Only the secret key shared between the sender and the receiver is unknown to the adversary.
D. Foundation of Analog Fountain Codes
Recently, bit-to-symbol analog fountain codes (AFC) have been proposed that approach the capacity of the Gaussian channel [21] [22] [23] . AFC is a real-valued and weighted form of binary fountain codes. Even though AFC is also a linear code, the important characteristics that the code symbols are realvalued and that each code symbol is the lossless combination of several message bits make them potential for aiding with the design of timing channels.
As shown in Fig. 2 , we denote each message bit m i as a message node and denote each code symbol c j as a symbol node. We consider a predefined degree distribution with generator polynomial
, where d denotes the maximum degree of the symbol node. The degree D i of each symbol node c i can be randomly selected from the degree set ϒ = {i | i = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , d}. In this paper, we assume that the degree of the symbols is a constant value D, i.e., (x) = x D . This implies that D different message bits can be randomly selected with the secret key K and linearly combined with real-valued weight coefficients. These weight coefficients, in fact, are the non-zero elements in the generator matrix G of AFC, which is a random matrix of size k × n that is determined by the secret key K . Note that k and n denote the numbers of message bits and code symbols, respectively. Only if g i, j = 0, there exists an edge connecting the message node m i to symbol node c j , and two nodes are adjacent if there exists an edge between them. The degree of a node (message node or symbol node) is measured by the number of corresponding adjacent nodes. As a result,
where
. . , k denotes the index set of message nodes which are adjacent to the symbol node c j .
We define a finite weight set w = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w D }, which is used to initialize the weight coefficients g i, j of randomly selected D message nodes adjacent to the symbol node c j . Under noiseless channel condition, all the adjacent message bits must be recoverable from a code symbol. This requires that there is a unique solution for each code symbol value. This can be ensured if
where n i ∈ {0, 1}. In this paper, we assume w i = a i /b i , where a i ∈ N + , b i denotes a prime number (e.g., 2, 3, 5, 7, etc.),
It is obvious that (3) can be satisfied with this setting. In order to avoid exponential error floor [24] , similar to the design strategy of regularized variable-node LT codes [25] , a max-min strategy is employed to randomly construct the generator matrix G. Specifically, in order to generate each code symbol, the corresponding D message nodes are randomly selected from the message nodes with the smallest degree. Therefore, the degree of the message node
For random message bits with P (m i = 0) = P (m i = 1) = 0.5, the CDFs of AFC code symbol values for different node degrees and typical weight sets are shown in Fig. 3(a) . The mean and variance of AFC code symbol values
, respectively. Since HTTP IPDs have been shown to be well approximated by Weibull distribution [26] , we compare the CDF of AFC code symbol values with that of Weibull distribution in Fig. 3(b) . We focus on AFC with node degree D = 8 and weight set w = {1/2, 1/3, 1/5, 1/7, 1/11, 1/13, 1/17, 1/19}, which has the best performance up to now and is adopted in this paper. The results show that the CDF of the AFC code symbol values is shape-similar to that of Weibull distribution.
III. RELATED WORK To achieve undetectability, the first IPD-based timing channel scheme to mimic the empirical IPD distribution of the legitimate traffic was designed by splitting the distribution into two parts one consisting of small delays and the other consisting of large delays. Based on this partition, a message bit-1 (0) is sent by randomly replaying a large (small) delay [27] . To further prevent detection, a general framework for designing model-based timing channels was proposed in [14] , which consists of filter, analyzer, encoder and transmitter. The filter and analyzer are designed to characterize the features of legitimate traffic and fit the features to a model. Then the covert traffic is generated according to the model with encoder and transmitter. However, the parameters of the model must be shared between the sender and the receiver frequently.
As network jitter and possible maliciously added network jammers (e.g., apply random delays over the network packets [28] ) may destroy the timing channels, achieving robustness along with undetectability is an important requirement in designing timing channels. A direct strategy to enhance the robustness of the timing channels is precoding the secret message bits with error correcting codes. In [18] , a simple Geometric code in conjunction with pseudo random generators is employed to construct a provable undetectable timing channel scheme for independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) traffic. However, the protection level of the secret message is not very good which can only work under a strong assumption that the network jitter is bounded in a reasonable scope. The study [6] , [7] proposed a robust and undetectable timing channel scheme for i.i.d. traffic using spreading codes. There is no assumption on the network jitter. However, a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG) is required to guarantee model security. In [19] , LT codes are employed to improve the robustness of timing channel, and then the encoded message bits are modulated based on a well-known statistical model. Compared to schemes employing finite codes, continually generated code symbols are transmitted until the secret message is decoded correctly. The study also implements a guard band strategy at the sender or the receiver in model-based modulation or demodulation to further improve the robustness. A more efficient turbo covert channel is proposed in [20] , which also employs precoding and guard band strategy. In fact, the existing two main strategies to improve the robustness including precoding and guard band both allow to trade undetectability of the covert channel for robustness and capacity. The precoding strategy allows tradeoff between capacity and robustness. The advantage of employing rateless code is that the throughput of the timing channel adapts to the channel characteristics, while the error correcting capability is always weaker than finite codes. On the other hand, the guard band strategy implemented at the sender is to trade undetectability for robustness. The buffer of guard band between the IPDs distribution segments eliminates IPDs that correspond to the buffer range, whereas the guard band implemented at the receiver will results in the reduction of throughput.
Although these studies has been able to achieve good performance in terms of undetectability and robustness, they are all implemented with model-based modulation. Consequently, the problem of model update is still a challenging task. In this paper, we give a new general framework to design timing channels equipped with undetectability, robustness and model-adaptation.
IV. ANALOG FOUNTAIN TIMING CHANNELS BASED ON SYMBOL TRANSITION
As AFC can generate real-valued code symbols and the encoding process is reversible, AFC is extremely suitable in the design of covert timing channels. In this section, we propose a general model-fitting coding framework based on symbol transition to construct an undetectable, robust and model-adaptive timing channel. The timing channel can be implemented on packet streams with IPD distribution which is shape-similar to the distribution of the AFC code symbol values. Based on AFC code symbols and a derived symbol probability transition matrix, the secret message bits are encoded with a model-fitting encoder with IPDs distributed as that of the target model. At the receiver, the decoding algorithm uses the observed IPDs to decode the message bits. The functional blocks of an analog fountain timing channel based on symbol transition, referred to as ST-AFTC, is shown in Fig. 4 .
For a given analog fountain code C, secret message m is first encoded into code symbols c, which are then linearly mapped into symbols c * to match with the value range of the model. Then, with the model S acquired from the legitimate traffic, the symbol probability transition matrix M ST is determined by the probability transition matrix constructor, which is used to implement symbol transition to redistribute the linearly mapped symbols as the resulting IPDs d s . The packets with IPDs d s are then transmitted to the receiver through a multi-hop network. With the noisy versiond of the IPDs, the estimated messagem can be decoded with the modified belief propagation (BP) algorithm. As shown in Fig. 4 , the proposed frame consists of the probability transition matrix constructor, the model-fitting encoder and the decoder. These are described in detail in the following subsections.
A. Probability Transition Matrix Constructor
The probability transition matrix constructor is employed to construct the symbol probability transition matrix M ST , which represents the transition probability of each linearly mapped AFC code symbol. For a given analog fountain code C with weight set w = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w D }, the cardinality of the corresponding sorted symbol set s = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s 
where s * i ∈ s * , shift parameter α = a + and shape parameter
Given the CDF of the model F(x), the vector p = ( p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p t ) of probability mass function (PMF) corresponding to linearly mapped symbol set s * is given by
We then construct a symbol probability transition matrix M ST of size t × t with the probability transition matrix constructor. Element m i, j of M ST represents the probability of symbol s * i transferring to a value between the linearly mapped symbol s * j −1 and s * j . Since M ST is a stochastic matrix it should satisfy the following properties
In fact, M ST determines the power of the model-fitting noise added to the linearly mapped symbols. To construct a symbol probability transition matrix, the goal is to minimize the power of the model-fitting noise approximately which is given by
In Appendix A we give the Symbol Transition Matrix Construction Algorithm which constructs M ST by approximately achieving the goal in (8).
B. Model-Fitting Encoder
With the symbol probability transition matrix M ST , the secret message m ∈ {0, 1} k can be encoded into the resulting IPDs with the model-fitting encoder. First, the message bits are encoded with AFC, G is the generator matrix which is randomly constructed with the shared secret key. The code symbols c are given by
The code symbols c are then linearly mapped into c * with the shift parameter α and the shape parameter β given in (5 
C. Decoder
The received IPDsd is a noisy version of the IPDs d s and is given byd
where n a = {δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . , δ n } denotes the model-fitting noise and n b denotes the channel noise. At the receiver, the generator matrix is reconstructed with the shared secret key K , the two linear mapping parameters α and β are also shared. In fact, as the model is acquired from the filtered legitimate traffic at the sender, the value range of the model is assumed to be constant whereas the distribution may change over time. Consequently, the two linear mapping parameters do not need to be updated at the receiver. Even if in the worst case these parameters change, they are very easy to be synchronized. The task of the decoder is to find m which maximizes the posterior probability Pr d |m, G, α, β . As there is no knowledge of the CDF of the model and the characteristic of the channel noise, the estimationm of the secret message bits is the message m which minimizes the Euclidian distance and is given bŷ
In [23] , the BP algorithm is implemented to decode the message with the assumption that the channel noise is Gaussian and is known to the receiver. In this paper, we give a modified BP algorithm which can realize (12) without knowledge of the model-fitting noise and the channel noise.
Let N ( j ) = i |g i, j = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , k denote the index set of message nodes which are adjacent to the symbol node c j , whereas N( j )\i represents the same set with the exclusion of the message node m i . Let M (i ) = j |g i, j = 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n denote the index set of symbol nodes which are adjacent to the message node m i , whereas M (i ) \ j represents the same set with the exclusion of the symbol node c j . Let R l i j (a) denote the probability that in the l-th iteration the message node m i has the value a, a ∈ {0, 1}, given that the message is received from the symbol node c j . Similarly, we let Q l i j (a) denote the probability that in the l-th iteration the message node m i has the value a given the messages provided by all its adjacent symbol nodes except the symbol node c j .
In the l-th iteration, though the distribution of model-fitting noise and channel noise is unknown to the receiver, the sender approximately minimizes the power of the model-fitting noise and makes the distribution approximately Gaussian-like with the designed M ST . In practice, the distribution of the channel noise is such that the probability of noise with a larger magnitude is lower than that of the noise with a smaller magnitude. Thus, the distribution of the composite noise can be approximately represented as the inverse square form of the magnitude to realize the convergence of the BP algorithm. In the proposed scheme, we calculate the R l i j (a) as follows,
denotes the probability density function of the composite noise, and C l i j is the normalization factor in the l-th iteration, which ensures that
On the other hand, the probability Q l i j (a) is given by
where U l i j is the normalization factor in the l-th iteration, which ensures a∈{0,1} Q l i j (a) = 1. After a given number of iteration, denoted as T , the final estimated probability distribution of the message nodes is given by
where V i is the normalization factor in the l-th iteration, which ensures that a∈{0,1} p a i = 1. The estimated message bits m can be determined as, if
V. ANALOG FOUNTAIN TIMING CHANNELS BASED ON SYMBOL SPLIT ST-AFTC is designed to achieve model-adaptation while maintaining undetectability and robustness. The effectiveness of the approach relies on minimizing the power of modelfitting noise. This is determined by the symbol probability transition matrix M ST that is designed as a diagonal-density matrix while satisfying (7) . Specifically, the non-zero elements in the matrix should be centered along the diagonal and should be as large as possible. This can efficiently reduce the power of the model-fitting noise. Thus, ST-AFTC can only perform well for packet streams with IPD distribution which is shape-similar to the distribution of the AFC code symbol values. In this paper, the IPD distribution of the packet stream is considered to be shape-similar to the distribution of the AFC code symbol values if the first-order statistics of the two distributions are approximately equal. Specifically, round (μ s * /μ M ) equals to 1, where μ s * = s * 1 + s * t /2 denotes the mean of the linearly mapped symbol set s * and μ M denotes the mean of IPDs of the legitimate traffic. This requirement on the legitimate traffic implies that ST-AFTC can only be implemented on a limited set of overt application packet streams. In order to make analog fountain timing channels applicable to more general traffic types, a feasible strategy is that we split each linearly mapped AFC code symbol into several sub-symbols with a pre-defined probability distribution which ensures that the sum of the sub-symbol values is close to the symbol value. Additionally, the distribution of resulting sub-symbol values is shape-similar to the distribution of IPDs. Here, we assume that the symbol split number N is a constant. As the mean of split symbol values decreases linearly with N, to ensure that the first-order statistic of the split code symbol values is close to that of the IPDs of legitimate traffic, N can be determined by N = round (μ s * /μ M ).
In this section, we present an analog fountain timing channels based on symbol split (SS-AFTC). This scheme achieves model-fitting by using a well-designed symbol probability split matrix to control the probability of each linearly mapped symbol that is split into sub-symbols of different values. At the sender, each linearly mapped symbol is randomly split into a group of IPDs according to the corresponding probability mass vector derived from the symbol probability split matrix. At the receiver, each group of IPDs is combined to recover the noisy version of the linearly mapped symbol. The symbol probability split matrix does not need to be shared between the sender and the receiver. SS-AFTC is an extension of ST-AFTC. For given scenario, which of the two methods is used is determined by the ratio
The functional blocks of SS-AFTC is shown in Fig. 6 . Similar to ST-AFTC, the secret message m is first encoded into the code symbols c, which are then linearly mapped into symbols c * to match with the value range of the model S. Then, the symbol split number N = round (μ s * /μ M ) is computed and each linearly mapped symbol c * i ∈ c * will be split into N IPDs. With the model S, the symbol probability split matrix M S S can be determined by the probability split matrix constructor, which is further used to generate split group set Z and corresponding group probability set p Z . Each linearly mapped symbol c * i ∈ c * is then randomly split into N IPDs according to the split group set and group probability set. The packets with IPDs d s are then transmitted to the receiver through the channel. With the observed IPDsd and the shared symbol split number N, the noisy version of the linearly mapped symbolsĉ can be obtained with IPD group combinator, the sum of each successive N IPDs is viewed as a linearly mapped symbol. The BP algorithm is then implemented to decode the secret message.
We begin with the construction of the t × t-sized symbol probability split matrix M S S whose element m i, j represents the portion of the linearly mapped symbol s * i split into the value between the linearly mapped symbol s * j −1 and s * j . Let p = ( p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p t ) denote PMF of the linearly mapped symbol set s * in (6) . Since the symbol split matrix is an unnormalized stochastic matrix it satisfies the following two properties.
Determining M S S is achieved by minimizing the power of the model-fitting noise and is expressed as
where v i denotes the expectation of random value between s * i−1 and s * i generated by the model and CSPRNG, which is given by
In Appendix B, we describe the Symbol Split Matrix Construction Algorithm which yields M S S by approximately achieving (17) . With the symbol probability split matrix M S S , even though the split probability of each sub-symbol is determined, the split pattern of each linearly mapped symbol should be optimized to further reduce the model-fitting noise. Thus, the symbol probability split matrix is used to generate a split group set Z and corresponding group probability set p Z . Denote m i, j 1 , m i, j 2 , . . . , m i, j q as the set of nonzero elements in the i -th row of M S S , the corresponding split group and group probability are Z i and p i Z , respectively. Z i is a N × L i -sized matrix, each column of which should be identified and included by the index set j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j q , p i Z is a vector of length L i . They should satisfy (19) .
where γ j l ,y denotes the number of index j l in the y-th column of Z i , e.g., if symbol split number N = 2, the i -th row of M S S is {0, 1.6, 0, 0.4}, then
With the split group set Z and group probability set p Z , the secret message is then encoded into IPDs with modelfitting encoder, similar to ST-AFTC. The secret message bits m ∈ {0, 1} k are encoded with AFC and the code symbols c are linearly mapped into c * with the shift parameter α and shape parameter β in (5). For each linearly mapped symbol c * i , we randomly split it into N IPDs d s
where 1) is a random index in the set 1, 2, . . . , p r Z according to the distribution probability p r Z , l is unique for one group of IPDs, rd (a, b) denotes a random value between a and b. Thus the model-fitting disturbance δ i for the linearly mapped symbol c * i is given by
At the receiver, the noisy version of the linearly mapped symbols can be recovered from the received IPDs usinĝ
which can be used to decode the secret message with the same decoder used in ST-AFTC. Fig. 7 shows overview of the encoding process using SS-AFTC.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS In this section, we benchmark the proposed analog fountain timing channel schemes (ST-AFTC and SS-AFTC) by examining the undetectability, robustness and model-adaptation. As both the proposed schemes can continuously generate IPDs due to the rateless property of AFC, in order to make a fair comparison, we compare the proposed schemes with two model-based timing channels that use rateless codes. One is the Fountain Timing Channel (FTC) based on LT codes proposed in [19] which is the first robust timing channel scheme based on rateless codes. The guard band strategy implemented at the sender and receiver are both considered; Fountain Timing Channel with the guard band at the sender is denoted as S-FTC while the scheme with guard band at the receiver is denoted as R-FTC. We also compare our proposed schemes with a model-based timing channel using AFC. In this scheme, the secret message is encoded with AFC and then the code symbols are modulated with sub-bands of CDF of the model. This scheme will be referred to MB-AFTC.
A. Experimental Setup
To analyze the performance of the timing channel schemes, we used network traffic generated by two applications, namely TeamViewer IP Voice (Version: v10.0.38475) [29] and Google Chrome Remote Desktop (Version: v.40.0.2214.82) [30] . These applications were selected as they represent two important types of packet streams used for timing channels, namely, VoIP and SSH traffic.
To capture the packet stream of TeamViewer IP Voice application, the destination was implemented in a host in the Computer Science Department at the University of California, Davis (UCDavis), which was connected to the Internet using wired Ethernet. The source was a laptop which was connected to the Internet via public WiFi in the UCDavis campus. This packet stream was referred to as Traffic A. For capturing the traffic of Chrome Remote Desktop, the destination was the laptop which was connected to the Internet via wireless router of a private residence in Davis, CA, USA while the source was a computer connected to the Internet using wired Ethernet in the CS Department at UCDavis. This packet stream was referred to as Traffic B. For both cases, the end-to-end connection was over multiple hops.
For Traffic A and Traffic B, we captured the IPDs both at the source and the destination. The statistical characteristics of the filtered IPDs and the channel noise are shown in Table I and Table II for Traffic A and Traffic B, respectively. The channel noise are obtained by comparing the difference between the IPDs with the same identification at two ends of the connection.
As the proposed timing channel schemes are both based on AFC which are rateless codes, the performance is primarily determined by the number of the observed packets at the receiver. Consequently, the pattern of packet loss has no influence on the performance. In fact, the packet loss rates were negligible; 0.12% for Traffic A and 0.047% for Traffic B. As a result, we do not discuss the packet loss in this paper.
We assume that the size of weight set D is 8 and we use the weight set {1/2, 1/3, 1/5, 1/7, 1/11, 1/13, 1/17, 1/19} in ST-AFTC, SS-AFTC and MB-AFTC. Covert transmission rate R denotes the ratio of the number of message bits to the number of received packets. For S-FTC and R-FTC, the generator matrix is established with the shared secret key and Robust Soliton distribution [31] , and the max-min strategy is employed to enhance the performance of the constructed LT codes. The width of guard band is set to 0.1. For the two types of traffic, the models are both established with over 10 4 packets. The ratio μ s * /μ M of the mean of the linearly mapped symbol set to that of model IPDs for Traffic A and Traffic B are 0.79 and 3.98, respectively. Consequently, we 
B. Undetectability
With the models established from captured samples of Traffic A and Traffic B, we calculate the CDFs of the covert IPDs for the five timing channel schemes. The number of the generated IPDs is set to n = 10 4 . The results are shown in Fig. 8 . Fig. 8(a) depicts the CDFs of ST-AFTC, MB-AFTC, S-FTC and R-FTC for Traffic A and Fig. 8(b) depicts the CDFs of SS-AFTC, MB-AFTC, S-FTC and R-FTC for Traffic B.
As we can see from Fig. 8 , ST-AFTC, SS-AFTC, MB-AFTC and R-FTC can mimic the model of the legitimate traffic very well. On the other hand, there is a difference between the CDF of S-FTC and that of the model. This is due to that the IPDs corresponding to the buffer range of guard band are eliminated. The gap in Fig. 8(a) is larger than Fig. 8(b) because the modulation-forbidden sub-band (
In order to evaluate the undetectability of the five schemes, we employed two statistical tests including KLD test and K-S test which are shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , respectively. Each point is obtained using the average of 10 samples. The horizontal axis denotes the number of IPDs and the vertical axis denotes the detection results.
From Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 we see that ST-AFTC, SS-AFTC, MB-AFTC and R-FTC are model-secure and they can maintain very good undetectability for both KLD and K-S test even when a small number of IPDs is considered for the test. The results of statistical tests tend to be stabilized gradually with increasing number of IPDs. When the number of IPDs n = 5000, the KLD of ST-AFTC, MB-AFTC and R-FTC are all lower than 0.16 for Traffic A, and that of We also find that the undetectability of S-FTC is a little worse. In Fig. 9(a) , KLD of S-FTC is obviously larger than that of ST-AFTC, MB-AFTC and R-FTC. When the number of IPDs n = 5000, the KLD of S-FTC is larger than 3 for Traffic A whereas it has similar performance with SS-AFTC, MB-AFTC and R-FTC in Fig. 9(b) because the modulation-forbidden sub-band corresponding to guard band for Traffic B is nearly negligible. The result in Fig. 10 show that the K-S test is effective in detecting S-FTC whereas all the other four timing channel schemes can evade the detection.
C. Robustness
To test the robustness, we consider two types of network noise. First we consider the real channel noise with statistical characteristics shown in Table I and Table II . Second we consider an AWGN, which is measured by the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR). Without loss of generality, we measure the robustness of timing channels with BER of the decoded secret message. The number of message bits is set to m = 3000. Fig. 11(a) shows the BER of ST-AFTC, MB-AFTC, S-FTC and R-FTC with the real channel noise for Traffic A. Fig. 11(b) shows the BER of SS-AFTC, MB-AFTC, S-FTC and R-FTC with the real channel noise for Traffic B. The horizontal axis denotes covert transmission rate R and the vertical axis denotes the BER of secret message. Unmarked point means the BER is 0.
As shown in Fig. 11 , the robustness of the proposed timing channel schemes ST-AFTC and SS-AFTC are both observably better than two FTC schemes S-FTC and R-FTC, and not as good as MB-AFTC. For Traffic A, the BER of ST-AFTC is about 10 −2 and 10 −1 when R = 0.5 bpp and R = 1 bpp, respectively, whereas the BER of MB-AFTC achieve 10 −2 when R = 1 bpp and decreases to 0 when R ≤ 0.625 bpp. However, the performance of S-FTC and R-FTC are similar and in some cases, the BP algorithm in the decoder does not converge. In fact, in such cases, the performance can only be improved very little even with a small value of R. For Traffic B shown in Fig. 11(b) , the BER of SS-AFTC is about 10 −2 and 10 −1 when R = 0.125 bpp and R = 0.25 bpp, respectively. Whereas the BER of MB-AFTC can be reduced to 10 −3 when R = 0.125 bpp.
The comparison of the five timing channel schemes under AWGN channel is shown in Fig. 12 . For Traffic A, we can find that when SNR = 35dB, the BER of ST-AFTC and MB-AFTC are still much better than that of S-FTC and R-FTC. When covert transmission rate R = 0.5 bpp, the BER of ST-AFTC and MB-AFTC is about 10 −2 and 10 −3 , respectively. However, when SNR = 45dB, the BER of S-FTC and R-FTC can both be reduced to 0 when covert transmission rate R ≤ 0.5 bpp, and the BER of MB-AFTC equals to 0 for covert transmission rate R ≤ 5/7 bpp. For Traffic B, when SNR = 20dB, SS-AFTC can achieve better robustness than MB-AFTC, S-FTC and R-FTC. The BER of SS-AFTC can achieve about 0.04 whereas that of MB-AFTC is about 0.13 for covert transmission rate R = 0.125 bpp, when SNR = 30dB, the BER of SS-AFTC is about 10 −3 and that of MB-AFTC is 0 for covert transmission rate R = 0.125 bpp. S-FTC and R-FTC have both poor robustness for Traffic B with 20dB and 30dB AWGN.
In summary, ST-AFTC, SS-AFTC and MB-AFTC perform efficiently on the channels with high network jitter and for traffic which is not very well suited for establishing timing channels. On the other hand, S-FTC and R-FTC can achieve robustness only when the channel noise is low.
D. Model-Adaptation
Model-adaptation defined by the metric θ R in (1) is an important performance metric for timing channels due to the non-stationary nature of real packet stream, the model adopted in above experiments is initially shared between the sender and the receiver before the timing channel is established. The model is then modified at the sender while remaining unchanged at the receiver. For modifying the model at the sender in our experiments, the CDF of the model is divided into intervals to get probability mass function, we randomly increase or reduce the corresponding probability mass value in each interval with a random proportion rd ( p, p + 0.1) and then normalize them. This results in the sender and the receiver to diverge with respect to the model. The difference between original model and the modified model is measured with KLD. We then study the model adaptation of the proposed schemes by changing the parameter p. Fig.13 illustrates the modified CDFs and corresponding KLD for Traffic A and Traffic B with different adjustment parameter p. As S-FTC and R-FTC cannot achieve robustness even when the models between the sender and receiver are consistent, we only compare the model-adaptation of the proposed schemes with that of MB-AFTC. The covert transmission rates are R = 0.5 bpp and R = 0.125 bpp for Traffic A and Traffic B, respectively. The real channel noise and AWGN are both considered. The BER and model-adaptation of the proposed schemes with different adjusted CDFs are shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 , respectively. The horizontal axis denotes the KLD between modified model and original model while the vertical axis in Fig. 14 denotes BER and that in Fig. 15 denotes model-adaptation θ R .
As shown in Fig. 14, when the model at the sender is modified resulting in increase in the KLD between the modified model and original model, the robustness of MB-AFTC decreases rapidly while ST-AFTC and SS-AFTC can maintain the stable robustness. For Traffic A and Traffic B, the BER of ST-AFTC and SS-AFTC for modified model are both similar to that for original model. However, for MB-AFTC, the BER is very sensitive to the changes in the model. For Traffic A, when KLD = 0.4452, the BER of MB-AFTC is over 0.2 while that of ST-AFTC is still about 10 −2 . For Traffic B, even with KLD = 0.0019, the BER of MB-AFTC increases to 0.2 whereas that of SS-AFTC is lower than 0.05.
The results of model-adaptation for different modified models are shown in Fig. 15 . For Traffic A and Traffic B, the model-adaptation θ R of ST-AFTC and SS-AFTC are both always close to 0 with different KLD whereas that of MB-AFTC is lower than −0.4 when KLD ≥ 0.0477 for Traffic A and lower than −100 when KLD = 0.0019 for Traffic B. From above results we can conclude that ST-AFTC and SS-AFTC can both maintain much better model-adaptation than MB-AFTC. Consequently, both ST-AFTC and SS-AFTC allow the sender to adjust the target model to maintain undetectability without loss of robustness.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed covert timing channels using analog fountain codes that not only meet the traditional goals of undetectability and robustness but are also model-adaptive. The latter implies that the sender can update the target model without synchronizing with the receiver. This allows the sender to adapt to the changes in the IPD distribution of the application traffic. Moreover, since the proposed schemes are based on rateless codes, they can also be directly extended to multicast timing channels in which different receivers have different channel conditions. The proposed schemes are based on a model-fitting framework and we have shown how it can be used to handle different types of packet streams. Using experiments with real traffic we have demonstrated the effectiveness of the timing channels with respect to undetectability, robustness and model-adaptation.
Even though the proposed timing channel schemes have been shown to be suitable for majority of existing VoIP and SSH traffic, they may not perform well for particular type of network traffic. Addressing this will make the proposed schemes more general. Another issue is the convergence of the BP algorithm when the noise power is very high. Methods to improve the decoding algorithm in the presence of maliciously-added noise is also part of future work.
APPENDIX A TRANSITION MATRIX CONSTRUCTION ALGORITHM
The M ST at the sender should be updated when the traffic model changes. Consequently, a brute force approach to determine M ST that optimizes function in (8) under the constraint given in (7) is not feasible. We give a fast heuristic algorithm that finds a sub-optimal M ST . Input: discrete PMF vector p Output: symbol probability transition matrix M ST 1: Initialization: {Define the unnormalized transition matrix, column state vector, row state vector and state matrix} 2: P = {0} t ×t ; c s = r s = {0} t ; P s = {0} t ×t ; {P is the unnormalized transition matrix. c s is the column state vector, if the i -th column of the matrix P is determined, c s (i ) = 1; otherwise, c s (i ) = 0. Similarly, r s is the row state vector. P s is the state matrix of all elements, if the j -th element in the i -th row of the matrix P is determined, P s (i, j ) = 1; otherwise, P s (i, j ) = 0. if u < c then 12: ci = ψ (ki ); c = u; {ψ = {i |c s (i ) = 0}, t c is the number of elements in ψ.} 13: end if 14: end for 15: Horizontal Processing: 16 : ri = 0; r = 1; 17: for k j = 1 to t r do 18: v = 1/t − ci∈{i|P s (ω(kj ),i)=1} P (ω (k j) , ci ); 19: if v < r then 20: ri = ψ (k j); r = v; {ω = { j |r s ( j ) = 0}, t r is the number of elements in ω.} 21: end if 22 : end for 23: Comparison between columns and rows: 24: if c ≤ r then 25: P ( j, ci ) = c; { j is the index which can minimize | j − ci | while P s ( j, ci ) = 0.} 26: else 27: P (ri, j ) = c; { j is the index which can minimize | j − ri| while P s (ri, j ) = 0.} 28: end if 29: end for 30: Normalization: M ST = t · P; 31: return M ST
